LOTKIP: Low Overhead TKIP Optimization for Ad Hoc Wireless Network by Doomun, M. Razvi & Soyjaudah, K. M. Sunjiv
 1
LOTKIP: Low Overhead TKIP Optimization for Ad Hoc Wireless 
Network 
 
 
M. Razvi Doomun* 
Computer Science and Engineering Department, Faculty of Engineering,  
University of Mauritius, Reduit, Mauritius Tel: +230 781 8923; Fax: +230 465 7144 
r.doomun@uom.ac.mu  
*Corresponding author 
 
K.M. Sunjiv Soyjaudah 
Electrical and Electronic Department, Faculty of Engineering,  
University of Mauritius, Reduit, Mauritius Tel: +230 454 1041; Fax: +230 465 7144 
ssoyjaudah@uom.ac.mu 
 
Abstract:  
 
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) is a provisional solution for Wired Equivalent Privacy 
(WEP) security loopholes present in already widely deployed legacy 802.11 wireless devices. 
In this work, we model and analyse the computational complexity of TKIP security mechanism 
and propose an optimised implementation, called LOTKIP, to decrease processing overhead for 
better energy efficient security performance. The LOTKIP improvements are based on 
minimising key mixing redundancy and a novel frame encapsulation with low overhead. We 
simulate and compare LOTKIP with baseline TKIP in terms of complexity and energy 
consumption for ad hoc wireless network security. From simulation results, we demonstrate 
that LOTKIP executes with lower computational complexity, hence, with faster encryption 
time and more energy-efficient. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
As a security enhancement for IEEE 802.11 wireless networks, WiFi Protected Access 
(WPA) use Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) mechanism for encryption. WPA is also 
optional in the new IEEE 802.11i security standard (referred as WPA2) [11]. TKIP mechanism 
is a provisional scheme used to strengthen security of IEEE 802.11 WLAN and is implemented 
through software advances. It reuses RC4 of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol as its 
core, but introduces upgrading in the areas of message integrity, IV creation, and key 
management and plays the part of a wrapper to increase the security of WEP [1]. However, 
TKIP security mechanism consumes precious CPU cycles in 802.11b wireless network devices 
as it incurs extra computation and communication overhead. For battery-powered and low 
processing capacity wireless devices, TKIP encryption/decryption operations cause extra delays 
in communication, decrease in effective bandwidth and increase energy consumption. The 
encapsulation process and message integrity check increase the size of transmitted packets, 
which in turn lower the effective bandwidth and increase the communication cost. Further, 
executing wireless security protocol, even including key exchanges, leads to extra network 
traffic. Hence, minimising security overhead and optimising power consumption are important 
challenges to wireless security design.  
Supplementary power and resource utilization drain that TKIP security enhancements 
impose require research attention. There is a need for comprehensive quantitative security and 
complexity analysis of TKIP key mixing function and encapsulation process, even so 
cryptographic review thus far suggests it achieves its fundamental design goals. Overall 
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processing limitations as well as energy consumption need to be alleviated with more efficient 
TKIP security implementations, which is especially desirable in battery-powered wireless 
devices for certain ad hoc wireless networks.  
In this paper, we present a mathematical relationship model between power consumption 
and TKIP encryption complexity. A simple and efficient low overhead TKIP (LOTKIP) 
technique is also proposed as a trade-off between security overhead and power consumption 
which is suitable for ad hoc wireless network security. We consider TKIP key mixing function 
and RC4 encryption algorithms specified in [11] for our analysis and simulations. Energy 
consumption models of 802.11b wireless device operation and cryptographic algorithm 
processing are used to simulate and validate the performance and efficiency of LOTKIP for 
specific scenarios.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.0 gives an account of related work 
in the field of wireless security optimisation and energy consumption models. We present an 
overview of TKIP algorithm in Section 3.0. The TKIP complexity model is analyzed in Section 
4.0. Then, we explain LOTKIP details in section 5.0. The simulations and performance of 
LOTKIP are discussed in Section 6.0, followed by concluding remarks in Section 7.0. 
2.0 RELATED WORK 
Most wireless security algorithms are designed based on models that do not take into 
account the security performance together with computational complexity and energy cost. In 
[16], a lightweight enhancement (LWE) to RC4 is proposed to operate in resource constrained 
wireless devices where 64-bit WEP is hardwired. The enhancement approach is based on 
derangement and complementation that use a block cipher mode of operation on top of 64-bit 
RC stream cipher to enhance security. LWE exponentially increase security strength with 
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logarithmic expenditure of memory and power. State Based WEP presented by Srinivasan et al. 
[21] provides a strong, lightweight encryption scheme for battery-constraint wireless devices. 
Sate Based Key Hop saves significant processing power especially for packet sizes smaller than 
200 bytes as would be seen in wireless networks by avoiding RC4 state initialization on every 
packet. It eliminates all the security issues with WEP using the existing hardware at a speed 
greater than WEP and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA).  It has been noted that the energy 
consumption of most cryptographic algorithms increases in their software instantiations [5] 
[20]. Hence, bulk data encryption and message authentication algorithms for wireless security 
are among the dominant power sink in mobile wireless devices. Jones et al. [12] and Lettieri & 
Srivastava [15] have shown that one of the main causes of unnecessary energy consumption is 
security overhead and communication protocol over a wireless channel. Adaptability and 
optimization of security protocols have thus emerged as a key issue for security in ad hoc 
resource-constrained networks. Two principles suggested for achieving an energy efficient 
security system are to avoid unnecessary computations and reduce the amount/size of encrypted 
data transmission  [10]. However, existing security protocols for 802.11 wireless networks limit 
the efficient use of wireless station/node resources by significantly increasing amount of 
overhead required to secure data communication and decreasing throughput. Complex 
cryptographic processing also increases the delay between data transmissions. With 
unoptimized security protocols the data rates of wireless links decreases due to additional 
traffic or larger encrypted packet size incurred for authentication or verification services. 
Essentially, security mechanisms increase overall power and energy consumption in wireless 
devices, since computationally complex encryption and decryption procedures require multiple 
arithmetic operations and more processing cycles. In [8], the authors have measured the actual 
energy consumption of 802.11 wireless network interfaces operating in ad-hoc network 
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environments and showed that the amount of energy consumption is directly proportional to the 
size of data to be sent or received. The energy consumption models for data communication 
(transmission and reception) is expressed as linear equation of the form, E = (m × size) + b, 
where the coefficients m and b depend on the type of communication, i.e., broadcast, unicast, 
or packet discarded, and can be determined empirically. Similarly, in [14], the energy 
consumption per packet of cipher function is also modelled to be almost linear as a function of: 
a fixed cost (B) which is the energy overhead resulting from the computation required for key 
expansion process and is independent of the packet size, and a variable cost (A) that is 
dependent on the packet size. The overall model is simplified as E = B + xA for energy 
consumption per packet of size x bytes. These approved general models have been useful in 
performance evaluation of energy consumption of wireless security protocols.  
Several techniques have been investigated in [14] [5], to reduce energy consumption by 
limiting the duration transmission/reception of messages or designing more energy efficient 
idling techniques. Another active area of research interest is the optimization of security 
protocol efficiencies [7] [19] [13]. Prior work from Ganesan et al. [9] assesses the feasibility of 
different encryption schemes for a range of embedded architectures using execution time 
overhead measurements. Potlapally et al. [18] investigated energy consumption of different 
ciphers on the Secure Sockets Layer. Consequently, our work consolidates all earlier work on 
802.11 wireless securities and adds to fill this void of, by investigating design of energy 
efficient and low overhead TKIP encryption in an ad hoc wireless network scenario. 
3.0 TKIP ALGORITHM 
In this section we review the basics of TKIP algorithm.  
3.1 TKIP Basics 
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TKIP provides more security than WEP with no extra hardware. Based on specific 
redesigned attributes, TKIP algorithm fulfils the challenges of a higher security standard in the 
following ways: (i) Michael, a well-studied cryptographic message integrity code (MIC), is 
used for defeating forgeries. MIC is computed over the whole message and it also protects the 
source and destination address from falsification. (ii) A frame sequence numbering is used to 
defeat replay attacks. Out-of-order frames are flagged and replay attacks are mitigated. 
Attackers cannot capture valid encrypted traffic and re-transmit it at a later time. (iii) A per-
frame key mixing function is employed to defeat weak key attacks. TKIP derives a unique RC4 
key for each frame through key mixing process to mitigate attacks against weak WEP keys. 
The increased length of the IV makes it possible to generate a larger number of different keys. 
(iv) Lastly, a rekeying mechanism is included to defeat key collisions. TKIP is also equipped 
with key management operations. Another important constraint in the design of security 
mechanism for 802.11b and 802.11g mobile devices is the low-speed embedded CPU’s which 
cannot support computationally intensive security operations. We node here the idea behind 
TKIP is compatibility with existing hardware while minimizing the impact of enhancement 
operations on the device performance.  
In Figure 1, the TKIP encryption/decryption process between two wireless stations, A 
and B, is shown. At station A, a MIC is generated for the data and appended to the message 
which is fragmented if greater than MPDU size. Next, the MAC Header is added and the whole 
packet is encrypted. Before de-encapsulating a received MAC Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) at 
station B, TKIP extracts the TKIP sequence counter (TSC), WEP IV and Key ID from the 
packet. However, TKIP discards received MPDU that violates the sequencing rules, and 
otherwise uses the mixing function to reconstruct a WEP seed. The TKIP WEP seed is 
represented as a concatenation of WEP IV and RC4 key and passes on these with the MPDU to 
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WEP engine for de-encapsulation/decryption. If integrity check value (ICV) test is successful, 
the implementation reassembles the MPDU into a MAC Protocol Service Unit (MSDU). Upon 
successful MSDU reassembly, the receiver station B performs MIC verification step by 
recomputing the MIC over the MSDU source address, destination address, and MSDU data 
(but not the MIC field), and bit-wise comparing the resultant MIC against the received MIC. 
Successful MIC verification means the MSDU can be delivered to the upper level. If two MICs 
differ in any bit position (interpreted as MIC failure), the receiver will discard the packet and 
will engage in appropriate countermeasures. 
As specified in ref. [11],  TKIP MPDU is extended by 4 bytes to accommodate the new 
Extended IV (ExtIV) field and the MSDU format is expanded by 8 bytes, to accommodate the 
new MIC field. The simplified layout of the encrypted MPDU format is depicted in Figure 1. 
When the MSDU-with-MIC cannot be encoded within a single WEP-encapsulated MDPU, it is 
fragmented into appropriately sized MPDUs. The 4 bytes of ExtIV are added after the existing 
IV/Key ID Field, i.e. the IV and Key ID of 4 bytes is retained in the form as defined with 
baseline WEP. If the ExtIV bit is ‘0’ only the WEP style non-extended IV is transferred. When 
the ExtIV bit is set and the Extended IV field is supplied for TKIP, this indicates presence of 
extended mode to the receiver. The transmitting/receiving station keeps track of the IV value of 
to detect key exhaustion.  As noted in Figure 1, the extended IV field is not encrypted [11]. All 
the MPDUs generated from one MSDU are encrypted under the same temporal key by TKIP. 
TKIP employs non-reusable IVs as TKIP sequence counters (TSC) to prevent replay 
attacks [17]. With the same temporal or session key (TK), TSC is a monotonically increasing 
counter from 0x000 to 0xFFFF which starts from first packet transmission. The receiver rejects 
every packet that has a TSC less than or equal to the previous packet. When an IV sequence 
counter roll-over (0xFFFF --> 0x0000) is detected, the extended IV will be incremented.  
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Figure 1: TKIP encryption/decryption and expanded MPDU structure 
A total of 20 bytes headers are associated with TKIP IEEE 802.11 frame. The extended IV 
(4 bytes) and the MIC (8 bytes) amounts an overhead of 12 bytes. The setback of the TKIP 
sequence counter approach is related to IEEE 802.11 burst-acknowledgements, which indicates 
that up to 16 packets could be sent at once and then be acknowledged by one packet. The 
concept of replay window is used to monitor the counters. The receiver keeps track of the 
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highest TSC and the last 16 TSC values and when a new frame arrives it checks and classifies it 
as one of the following types: ACCEPT if TSC is larger than the largest seen so far, or 
REJECT if TSC is less than the value of the largest 16, or adjust the WINDOW if TSC is less 
than the largest, but more than the lower limit. Consequently, the sequence counter memorizes 
the last 16 IV values to guarantee that all packets have been correctly received. Frames are 
fragmented in the band from 256 to 2346 bytes threshold with the purpose to increase the 
transfer reliability. Larger frame size increases likelihood of interference and therefore higher 
retransmission rate. Small frame rate gives excessive overhead during the transmission and 
throughput reduction. 
3.1 TKIP Countermeasures  
MIC detects active attacks (unlike WEP’s Integrity Check Value (ICV)) and 
countermeasures are employed to prevent persistent message forgery attacks. However, TKIP 
still uses ICV in conjunction with the MIC to prevent false detection of MIC failures, and 
therefore thwart false countermeasure initiation. TKIP takes active countermeasures when two 
MIC failures are detected in less than one minute [11]. For MIC failure rate above one per 
minute, the station basically deletes all keys and attempts to reassociate (re-keying the 
connection) once more after a waiting period. However, this also implies that the attacker needs 
only two MIC-invalid packets per minute to completely prevent Wi-Fi users accessing the 
network. Although, normal network operation can resume at least 60s after the second MIC 
failure, to prevent this countermeasure from being used as a pedestal for a denial of service 
attack, the MIC is checked last in the TKIP de-encapsulation/decryption process. The risk of 
false alarms is minimized when MIC is verified after the CRC, IV and other checks have been 
performed [11]. Frames with invalid ICV and TSC are discarded before the MIC is verified. 
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Thus, ICV ensures that noise and transmission errors do not erroneously trigger TKIP 
countermeasures. Another countermeasure, when a new temporal key cannot be established 
before the full 16-bit space TSC is exhausted, then TKIP protected communications will cease. 
For key refresh failure, the implementation halts further data traffic until rekeying succeeds, or 
disassociates. Further, to strengthen the user authentication process, TKIP makes use of the 
802.1x framework and the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) as proposed in [11]. But 
even when addressing all known flaws of WEP, TKIP does not protect against denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks, since the countermeasure can be used to launch a DoS attack on the network. 
DoS attack can exhaust resources such as bandwidth, memory, CPU, etc. Moreover, TKIP is 
designed in such a way that its security completely relies on the secrecy of all the packet keys 
[17].  
TKIP stronger security comes at the cost of performance degradation, in terms of higher 
complexity and overhead. Key mixing operation is designed to put a minimum demand on the 
stations and access points, yet have enough cryptographic strength so that it cannot easily be 
broken. Key-mixing would be more CPU-intensive if not solved by a two-phase mixing 
process. Phase 1 key mixing is static and one-off with high 32 bits of the IV, and only changes 
every 64K packets. Phase 2 is executed on per-packet basic, but since the counter is 
predictable, phase 2 can be computed in advance while waiting for the next packet(s) to arrive 
at receiver. Computing a few mixed keys in advanced is a gainful approach to minimize 
decryption response time for strict time-constraint applications. Furthermore, in ad hoc IEEE 
802.11 wireless networks, the link throughput can be improved with an optimized TKIP 
mechanism.  
 
4.0 COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS 
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In this section we analyze and model the complexity of TKIP components. 
4.1 Michael Complexity Analysis 
Several viable implementations exist for secure message integrity checking, but the 
dilemma of the wireless LAN card is its limited finite computation capabilities. WPA uses 
cryptographic Message Integrity Code (MIC), called Michael, to support the ineffective Cyclic 
Redundacy Checksum (CRC) in WEP. Its characteristics conform to first generation Access 
Point devices having low 32-bit CISC power processors with limited MIP budget of 4 millions 
of instructions per second having to reuse existing WEP hardware [23]. MIC has three 
components: a secret authentication key (K), a tagging function, and a verification predicate. 
TKIP cannot use computationally intensive cryptographic methods over existing 802.11b 
WLAN hardware with low-power processor. Even if cryptographic computations are shifted to 
software level in clients, it is hard for resource-constrained devices to sustain heavy 
computations. Thus, Michael is chosen as usable method for computing MIC in TKIP. 
Compared to WEP, the overall TKIP is a costly process and could degrade performance at 
many access points by consuming every spare CPU cycle. MIC algorithm operates on MSDUs 
to reduce overhead as it is not necessary to append a MIC value to every MPDU fragment of 
the message. In distinction, TKIP encryption functions at the MPDU level. Michael key is 64 
bits, represented as two 32-bit little-endian words (K0,K1). Given a message of the form 
(Source_Adr||Destination_Adr||Data), it is partitioned into a sequence of 32-bit chunks and the 
last one is padded, if not full, with 0x5A and enough zeros. Hence, the last word Mn is always 
zero and the second to the last word is always non-zero because of 0x5A padding. An iteration 
is performed over the partitioned sequence of 32-bit words M1, M2, …, Mn, where n is the total 
number of words. In each step, Mi is mixed with the 64-bit key using XORs, rotations, bit 
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swaps, and little-Endian additions, as shown in the code next. The tag is computed using the 
following simple iterative code structure: 
 
The main operations in MIC algorithm are: Exclusive OR (XOR), two’s complement 
addition (ADD), rotate left/right (ROT), discarding any bits of higher significance than n 
(MOD), i.e. mod (232) and given a 32-bit word, swap lower 16 bits and upper 16 bits 
(XSWAP). The computational effort required for MIC calculation of message (M) is a function 
of the number of 32-bit words message size (M0, …, Mn) and the number of processing cycles 
required for performing all basic operations in MIC algorithm is expressed as: 
 
The following Boolean equivalence assumptions and simplifications are made which 
have negligible impact on the overall computation: ADD and MOD operations are 
approximated to XOR operation complexity, XSWAP and ROT are approximated to SHIFT, 
and 22 bitwise ROT is rounded to 3 bytewise SHIFT. Then, we have: 
 
Considering Tand, Tor, and Tshift to denote the numbers of processing cycles required for 
performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise SHIFT 
respectively. The equation is: 
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where n is number of 32-bit words in message M. 
Hence, the approximate number of processing cycles required for performing all operations in 
MIC is expressed as: 
 
4.2 CRC Complexity Analysis 
The fundamental mathematics behind CRC algorithm is polynomial division. The table 
look-up CRC algorithm method is used with pre-calculated CRC values as shown next: 
 
Applying a similar complexity analysis approach, the number of processing cycles, TCRC-
CALC, required for performing all basic operations in CRC for m bytes is expressed in general 
terms as: 
 
Considering Tand, Tor, Tmem and Tshift to denote the numbers of processing cycles 
required for performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, a byte memory 
access and a byte-wise SHIFT respectively. The approximate number of processing cycles 
required for CRC on m bytes is given as: 
 
4.3 Key Mixing Complexity Analysis  
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For efficient computation, key mixing benefits from two phase operations as follows:  
Phase I Key Mixing  
Phase 1 mixes Temporal Key (128-bit TK) with upper IV part TSC0 …. TSC5 (48-bit) 
and the transmitter’s MAC address (48-bit TA), to create an intermediate key called phase 1 
key (128-bit TTAK). For performance optimization, 80-bit intermediate key TTAK is normally 
cached for (216 – 1) packets and recomputed only when the temporal key is changed or updated. 
By mixing the MAC address with TK, Phase 1 key mixing ensures that even if various stations 
use the same temporal key, still different key streams will be generated. The main operations 
used in phase 1 are: XOR denoted as ⊕ and S-box substitution (S) with  all arranged as 16-bit 
values. The following standard algorithm of Phase 1 which appears in [11] is employed. Input 
parameters are 48-bit TA TA0 …. TA5, 128-bit TK TK0 …. TK15, and TSC0…. TSC5. Output is 
intermediate key TTAK0 …….. TTAK4. 
 
 
The function MK16 constructs a 16-bit value from two 8-bit inputs as MK16(X,Y) = (256*X) + Y. 
We deduce the computational operations for Phase 1 key mixing as: 
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Assuming LOOP_NUM = L, then 
 
Considering Tand, Tor, and Tmem to denote the number of processing cycles required for 
performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise substitution 
(SBT) from memory, respectively, we have: 
 
And, if L = 8, we obtain: 
 
Phase 2 Key Mixing 
Phase 2 key mixing takes as input, TTAK (80 bits) with TK (128 bits) and the last 16 
bits of IV to generate a unique 128-bit RC4 key, also known as WEP seed. It employs S-box 
substitution, rotate operation and addition operation to generate the 128-bit per-packet RC4 key 
(PPK). The 128-bit per-packet RC4 key has an internal structure that must conform to the WEP 
specification for compatibility. In both phase 1 and phase 2 key mixing function, an S-box is 
used for non-linear substitution and the strength of the cryptosystem depends heavily on the 
quality of the S-box lookup table [17]. The WEP seed is represented as an array of 8-bit values, 
WEPSeed0 …WEPSeed15. When the TSC space is exhausted, we can either replace TK with a 
new one or stop the communications. The 32 bits IV fed in phase 1 is changed whenever the 16 
bits in phase 2 have been used up.  Phase 2 makes use of a variable Per-Packet key [PPK] of 96 
bits. It is represented as an array of 16-bit values: PPK0….PPK5 and the PPK values are 
mapped onto the TTAK values after iterations of a loop. The exclusive-OR operation [⊕], 
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addition operation [+], AND operation [&], OR operation [ | ], and right-bit SHIFT operation 
[>>>] are used in the specification of Phase 2  [11] as given next. 
 
Lo8 function refers to the least significant 8 bits of the 16-bit input value, Hi8 function refers 
the most significant 8 bits of the 16-bit value, RotR1 function rotates its 16-bit argument one 
bit to the right and  MK16 constructs a 16-bit value from two 8-bit inputs as MK16 (X,Y) 
← (256* X) +Y.  
The number of processing cycles for computational operations of phase 2 key mixing is: 
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For simplicity, a BytewiseMUL computation is computationally equivalent to 256 
BytewiseADD, which is approximated to 256 BytewiseXOR. Again, assuming Tand, Tor, Trot 
and Tmem denote the numbers of processing cycles required for performing basic operations of a 
byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise SBT from memory respectively. 
 
In baseline TKIP, Phase Loop Count value is chosen as 8, this maintains a balance between 
robustness in key mixing and complexity of key generation.  
Combining Both Key Mixing Computations 
Case 1: Without Phase 1 Caching scheme 
Key mixing (phase 1 and phase 2) process generates key stream for 128 bits data encryption, 
and the sum of key mixing computation, without phase 1 intermediate key caching, is 
expressed as: 
 
Case 2: With phase 1 Caching scheme 
The first 16 bytes encryption computation is: 
 
Subsequently, all next 16 bytes encryption computations incur: 
 
4.4 RC4 Complexity Analysis 
Standard RC4 algorithm is analyzed to determine its computational workload. RC4 process 
consists of Key scheduling component (KSA) and Pseudo random generation module (PRGA) 
to generate the key stream to be XOR with plaintext stream. 
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Number of processing cycles for computation of KSA is: 
 
Approximating ADD and MOD to XOR computation complexity, we have: 
 
Assuming Tand, Tor, and Tswap denote the number of processing cycles required for performing 
basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, and a byte-wise SWAP from, 
respectively. Thus, we have: 
 
 
Number of processing cycles for computation of PRGA is: 
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Using Tand, Tor, Tsub and Tswap to denote the number of processing cycles required for 
performing basic operations of a byte-wise AND, a byte-wise OR, a byte SUB and a byte-wise 
SWAP from, respectively, we obtain: 
 
Overall RC4 complexity 
The final operation in RC4 is to output (M[k] XOR RC4Key) to obtained the cipher text, 
where M[0, 1, ..., N-1] is the input message consisting of N bits. This additional XOR operation 
is included to obtain the overall number of processing cycles to compute encryption a byte of 
data as follows: 
 
Total number of processing cycles for m bytes of data encryption is, 
 
 
Table 1: Complexity decomposition of TKIP functions 
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Figure 2: TKIP computational effort 
As shown on Table 1 and Figure 2, the complexity of TKIP is observed to increase 
linearly with larger messages size (M). Without phase 1 caching, overall TKIP complexity 
increases at a rate of 5386 processing cycles per byte encryption. When Phase 1 key mixing 
caching scheme is applied, the computational complexity of TKIP is much lower now, which 
also explains that key mixing is has the most operational workload of all the components of 
TKIP. Comparatively, MIC complexity percentage contribution for messages up till 128 bytes 
of data is (0.8 - 5.5%), CRC complexity part is (0.1 -1.0%), Key mixing complexity share is 
(88.9 - 95.6%) and RC4 complexity involvement is (3.5 - 4.6%). However, the larger the 
message size, the more complex it is to compute the MIC using Michael. For very large 
message sizes (of the order of Kilobytes) MIC function is expected to be the dominant 
complexity component. 
 
4.5 TKIP Packet Transmission Overhead 
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Table 2: TKIP packet overhead field 
TKIP does extra computation for per packet key generation. MIC check accounts for additional 
computation and increases the payload by 8 bytes. WEP appends only 8 bytes extra (i.e. 3 bytes 
for IV, 6 bits zero reserved, 2 bits key ID and 4 bytes ICV) in an IEEE 802.11 frame, whereas 
there are a total of 20 bytes (i.e. 4 bytes IV and key ID, 4 bytes extended IV, 8 bytes MIC and 4 
bytes ICV) associated with TKIP in an IEEE 802.11 frame, as summarized in Table 2. Hence, 
TKIP extends the total length of a WEP encrypted MPDU by 12 bytes. IEEE 802.11 MSDU 
maximum size is explicitly 2304 bytes. The maximum MAC header and FCS overhead is 34 
bytes, but only frames between access points over a wireless distribution system use all MAC 
header fields.  
 
4.6 TKIP Key Managment 
For key refresh mechanism, TKIP deals with three types of keys that are hierarchical [11] [23]: 
Master key (MK), Key Encryption key (KEK) and Temporal key (TK). Initially, a MK is 
exchanged among workstations through 802.1x authentication servers. MK is directly related to 
authentication and is used for secure distribution of key streams, i.e. it is created after a 
successful authentication and is related to one session only. Secondly, a pair of KEK is securely 
distributed between the authentication server and the wireless station via the AP using the MK. 
One KEK is needed to encrypt distributed keying material, i.e. temporal keys, while a second 
KEK serves to protect re-key messages from forgery. The station and the access point then 
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generate a separate pair of TK for each direction of transmission in an association. Each pair of 
TK consists of a 128-bit data encryption key and a second 64-bit key for data integrity. These 
keys are identified by a 2-bit key ID. New TKs are always created with the first connection or 
re-establishment of connection.  
In wireless ad hoc network, a key management system is also needed to distribute 
authentication and encryption keys to stations securely. The absence of an Access Point makes 
key management and distribution a challenging task. For the functionality of LOTKIP in ad hoc 
network, we assume that it is possible to set pre-shared key among the wireless stations, i.e. 
keys are distributed to the devices participating in the communication beforehand. This static 
approach will work if all the devices sharing the key are known when the ad hoc network is 
setup. Otherwise, cluster architecture is used for proactive key sharing when new stations 
authentication with the cluster head of the ad hoc wireless network. Any secure key distribution 
and authentication schemes in [2] [4] can be used. 
 
5.0 LOW OVERHEAD TKIP 
In baseline TKIP, phase 2 key mixing function reuses the intermediate 80-bit TKIP mixed 
Transmit address and key (TTAK) or (P1K) for 216 consecutive MAC Protocol Data Units 
(MPDUs) during the same secure session.  These MPDUs are encrypted with the same 32-bit 
upper Initialization vector (IV) part, Temporal Key (TK) and Transmitter Address (TA). 
Hence, caching of 80-bit TTAK it conventionally used.  Since the knowledge of 32-bit high IV 
and the future sequence of 16-bit low IV is also known to the receiver after first packet 
tarnsmission, we modified the packet format to send the full 48-bit extended IV for the first 
packet initially and remove this redundancy in other successive packets. Therefore, in Low 
Overhead TKIP (LOTKIP) frame format, the redundant 4-bytes extended IV is removed from 
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the packet load for packets ranging from the 2nd to the (216 -1)th packet. With this scheme, if the 
first packet is correctly received in an error free channel, decryption keys can be pre-computed 
in advance. Figure 3 illustrates the packetization choice for LOTKIP mechanism. For wireless 
channel with frequent packet losses, a possible solution is to periodically include and send the 
4-bytes extended IV (act as a refresh after every K MPDUs). 
An acknowledgement (ACK) is sent back by the receiver to confirm LOTKIP packet 
delivery. Generally, the unicast packet of IEEE 802.11 does not support reordering, and the 
sender will only continue transmitting packets when it receives ACKs and packets with larger 
sequence number cannot overtake the packet with smaller sequence number. However, when 
wireless channel conditions degrade during transmission, the ACK message may not be 
received due to LOTKIP packets loss or ACK packet loss. An adaptive transmission control 
can be used, such that in the case of lost packets, data packet transmission stops and the source 
instead sends probes (short packets). Once acknowledgement of a probe is received, the sender 
resumes to normal transmission again with an initial LOTKIP packet type A, and then 
continues with LOTKIP packet type B. Further, LOTKIP encapsulation uses special flag bits 
for specific control purpose. The LOTKIP is particularly applicable for ad hoc wireless 
networks with short transmission range and low interference. 
Next, in LOTKIP the MIC also includes the IV part in its tag computation. The transmitter 
computes a keyed cryptographic message integrity code over the MSDU source and destination 
addresses, the priority bits, the MSDU plaintext data and the 48-bit Extended IV also. LOTKIP 
appends the computed new MIC to the MSDU data prior to fragmentation into MPDUs. The 
receiver obviously has to verify the MIC after decryption with Extended IV, ICV checking, and 
reassembly of the MPDUs into an MSDU. Invalid MIC means discarding of corresponding 
MSDUs, and this defends against forgery attacks and replay attacks. 
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Figure 3: LOTKIP procedure and MPDU format 
In the traditional baseline TKIP approach, the key reason why the IV is transmitted in the 
clear is because the 802.11 standard assumes that an adversary does not gain any useful 
information from its knowledge. The IV is meant to introduce randomness to the key, and 
appending the clear IV in the transmitted packet helps the receiver to decrypt the information 
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sent from the transmitter station. However, it has been proved that various types of attacks are 
possible using the IV knowledge as described in [22] [23] [3]. The proposed LOTKIP heals this 
problem, as well minimizes packet overhead and thus potentially saving on transmission 
energy. 
 
6.0 SIMULATION AND EVALUATION 
6.1 Energy Consumption Models 
802.11 WLAN device usually operate in one of the following modes: Transmit or Receive or 
Idle. When data bits are transmitted on the channel, the power consume is PT watts. When data 
bits are received and processed from the channel, the power consumed is PR watts. When the 
wireless card is idle, no transmission and reception of bits, the power spent is PI watts. 
Assuming the time length for which the WLAN card is in transmit, receive and idle mode are 
TT, TR and TI respectively, the total energy consumed will be (PT × TT) + (PR × TR) + (PI × TI). 
The highest power is consumed in the transmit mode when transmitting packets or forwarding a 
packet in a multi-hop ad-hoc network. In the idle mode, a WLAN device is required to sense 
the medium and will be omitted in our simulation as it does not impact on our comparative 
analysis. We apply a linear energy consumption model for Lucent IEEE 802.11b wireless card 
operations as given in Feeney et al.  [8]. According to this model, the energy consumption (E) 
in IEEE 802.11b networks is associated with the size of sent packets: E = (a × Size) + b, where 
a is the energy consumption per byte, and b is the overhead for sending a packet. The linear 
transmission and reception energy models for point-to-point transmission/receptions using 
IEEE 802.11b devices given by: T_Energy = 431 μJ + 0.48 μJ/bytes; and R_Energy = 316 μJ 
+ 0.12 μJ/bytes, respectively [8].  
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6.2 TKIP Energy Model 
Using the experimental results in [16], TKIP algorithm consumes 26804 μJ per 256 byte frame 
on a 1.8 GHz intel© P-4 processor, 512 MB RAM. For the functionality of our energy 
simulation, we assume that AND, OR, SHIFT, MEM, ROT and SWAP basic operations can be 
each executed in one CPU cycle. Thus, using the complexity model in section 4, TKIP (without 
key caching) will encrypt 256 bytes using 1356683 processing cycles. One CPU processing 
cycle execution approximately costs 0.0198 μJ. Simplifying the TKIP computational 
complexity equations, the TKIP energy model is given as follows: 
Case 1 (without key caching): 
 
TKIP_Energy = (175n + 5283m + 2835) × 0.0198 μJ,  
 
where n = (m/32), n ≥ 1, m is the number of bytes encrypted. 
 
Case 2 (with key caching): 
 
1st Packet (16 bytes): 
TKIP_Energy = (175n + 5283m + 2835) × 0.0198 μJ,  
 
where n = (m/32), n ≥ 1, m is the number of bytes encrypted in first packet. 
 
Subsequent Packets: 
TKIP_Energy = (175n + 1764m + 2835) × 0.0198 μJ,  
 
where n = (m/32), n ≥ 1, m is the number of bytes encrypted after first packet. 
 
 
6.3 Network Model 
We evaluate and compare the performance of the baseline TKIP and LOTKIP schemes in 
randomly-generated network topologies using 49 static wireless stations that are either 
transmitters or receivers are randomly placed within a (500 m x 500 m) flat area. The quasi 
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unit-disk graph (Quasi-UDG) model is used to simulate the non-uniform characteristics of 
wireless networks [6]. A Quasi-UDG with transmission range parameters R and Quasi-UDG 
factor α ( 0 ≤ α ≤ 1) over a set of positions in the network is defined as follows: For any two ad 
hoc wireless stations at positions u and v in the network with inter-station distance |uv|: if |uv| ≤ 
αR then a link exists between wireless station at u and v in the network; if |uv| > R then stations 
at u and v are not within direct transmission/reception range; and if αR < |uv| ≤ R then stations 
at u and v is connected probabilistically. We simulate 100 different scenarios of randomly 
selected transmitter-receiver pairs among the 49 nodes in the ad hoc wireless network and the 
results are averaged. In this simulation, we assumed the receiver node cannot be compromised 
and there is an existing key management system as described previously. 
 
6.4 Results and Discussions 
The maximum IEEE 802.11 MSDU size is 2312 octets before the frame body is encrypted. 
Frames are fragmented and tested from 256 to 2312 bytes length. 10,000 packets of size (P) are 
transmitted from randomly selected sources and destinations in the 49 nodes ad hoc network. 
End-to-end baseline TKIP (without key caching) encryption/decryption is applied to secure 
communication. The simulation is run for grid distribution and random distribution ad hoc 
nodes. 20 bytes header is appended to the packets P to form the TKIP encapsulated frames. The 
total energy consumption by all nodes in the network (Network Energy Consumption/Joules) is 
plotted in Figure 4. The dotted lines represent the results for random ad hoc wireless network. 
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Figure 4: Network energy cost comparison 
Dividing the Network Consumption Energy by the number of nodes/stations in the network, 
e.g. 49 nodes in our case, gives the average energy spent (Joules) per node/station. For brevity, 
we do not show the graph of average energy spent per node, since the overall trend is similar to 
Figure 4. As shown in the same figure, the network energy consumption increase linearly with 
larger packet size, assuming all other simulation parameters remain constant.  The energy 
efficiency factor gained by LOTKIP is given as {2.33 + (P × 0.00028)}, where P is the packet 
size (256 ≤ P ≤ 2048 bytes).  The network energy consumption of baseline TKIP augments at a 
faster rate compare to LOTKIP as the packet size gets bigger. Therefore, LOTKIP could be a 
better scheme to transmit larger packets securely at lower network energy cost. The simple and 
efficient optimization scheme in LOTKIP shows lower overhead and energy saving. Since all 
packets depend of the first LOTKIP packet which contained the IV part, this packet is of high 
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importance.  In our simulation we assumed that this critical packet is not lost or intercepted by 
adversaries. In real network transmissions, the first LOTKIP packet can be treated in priority 
and delivered securely by VNP tunneling techniques. 
However, we have not studied the energy consumption of WLAN attacks, such as 
denial of service attacks, related security countermeasures of LOTKIP. One approach to 
measure the efficiency of LOTKIP, and study how to minimize energy drain due to wireless 
LAN attacks, is to gauge its resilience to cryptanalysis attacks, such as brute-force attack, 
differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. 
 
7.0 CONCLUSION 
TKIP encryption/decryption is one of the persistent overhead in wireless security for the entire 
communication session.  In this paper, we have described, LOTKIP, a simple and optimized 
wireless security protocol that carries out power-efficient encryption and decryption. A 
mathematical complexity model of TKIP has been derived in terms of processing cycles of its 
basic operations and adapted to study the performance of LOTKIP. LOTKIP decreases 
complexity of wireless encryption while making LOTKIP frame transmission energy efficient. 
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